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Introduction: Community Policing between 
Aspiration and Reality
In 2014, United Nations Security Council resolutions on security sector reform (SSR) and on police 
operations as part of UN missions confirmed the stated aim to seek the sustained implementa-
tion of a “community-oriented approach” to policing in the respective mission countries.1 While 
promoting the implementation of community-oriented policing since for more than a decade,2 a 
clarification of what this approach should actually entail and how exactly the UN missions and 
operating UN agencies in as diverse country contexts such as Papua-New Guinea, Ukraine, or 
South-Sudan should pursue this approach is still missing.
Community policing has been increasingly promoted, particularly in liberal democratic socie-
ties, as a suitable approach to improve police service and effectiveness along the lines of demo-
cratic governance, to reduce the fear of crime within the communities and to overcome mutual 
distrust between the police and the communities by enhancing police-citizen partnerships. This, 
advertised as a best-practice approach to policing, soon found its way into the evolving international 
state-building and development agenda and became part of various development catalogues. In 
most cases, international donors tried to implement community policing in developing and tran-
sitional countries through short-term workshops and best-practice training manuals modelled on 
community-oriented policing approaches in liberal democratic societies. While these training pro-
grammes were probably designed with the best of intentions, they not only lacked relevance to the 
actual socio-political realities and challenges in most of the countries where the police reform pro-
grammes were initiated. The majority of the programmes also lacked a sound and congruent under-
standing of what community policing should actually be. Given the myriad of patchy definitional 
understandings and interpretations of and approaches to community policing in various countries, 
it is not surprising that internationally driven police reform initiatives aiming at the establishment 
of community policing in developing and transitional countries resulted in fair outcomes at best.3
Whereas most of the existing literature on international police reform endeavours puts its focus 
on technical and financial capacities only, so far there is a shortage of research that deals with the 
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actual impact of historical trajectories, cultures, and patterns of policing on contemporary SSR 
endeavours in the context of developing and transitional countries. Additionally, the concept of 
community policing remains particularly inconclusive and is still subject to various interpreta-
tions without the actual critical contextualization of its historical origins.
The merit of historically informed analysis of contemporary policies and political challenges is 
undisputed.4 However, only a few publications regarding security and developmental policy actu-
ally problematize historical legacies and their impact on contemporary security challenges, as, 
among others, Egnell and Haldén argue.5 Due to the dearth of historical inquiry in international 
security studies, the paper explicitly applies a historical perspective to investigate the origins and 
transformations of community-oriented policing.
By recapitulating existing ambiguities, disarray and confusion on the concept of community 
policing, its frequent but uncritical equation with democratic policing, and its simultaneous 
advertisement as a best-practice measure for police reform in developing and transitional coun-
tries, several questions arise: (1) What are the actual historical origins of present-day community 
policing, (2) what are the necessary conditions to establish community policing, and (3) to what 
extent is it possible to promote and to establish community policing along the lines of good gov-
ernance and SSR in developing and transitional countries?
To answer these research questions, the paper critically examines the historical origins of com-
munity policing and, in addition to it, draws on a conceptual framework of adaptation processes 
in governance transfers. Moreover, the paper makes a clear distinction between means and ends 
in community policing in order to highlight important technical and practical similarities but dif-
ferences in political country contexts and normative objectives of police reform.
It has to be stressed that normative objectives of police reform in non-democratic political 
systems differ substantially from democratic political systems. Depending on the actual politi-
cal agenda, non-democratic political systems may particularly focus on surveillance and social-
control elements of community policing that foster security. In contrast, democratic political 
systems generally follow the aim of implementing a variant of community policing that ideally 
fosters a service-oriented, accountable and people-centred security environment by the police, 
an approach that has been theoretically underpinned by John Alderson6 and Herman Goldstein,7 
among others.
By utilising the devised conceptual framework on adaptation processes, the discussed cases 
of Victorian Britain, Imperial and post-war Japan, Singapore, and Timor-Leste reveal important 
preconditions, dynamics, and setbacks regarding prospects and limitations of  implementing 
 community-oriented approaches to policing. In essence, the paper argues that the historical 
 origins of community policing were not directed at improving police-community relations in the 
first place, but at more effective surveillance and control mechanisms to uphold state security 
instead. Whereas contemporary approaches to community-oriented policing in line with SSR and 
good governance are tightly connected to political pluralist and liberal democratic norms and 
values, the basic concept of community policing itself is not bound to pluralist political systems.
Furthermore, it is argued that basic bureaucratic police professionalism and capacities are nec-
essary conditions to establish community policing as part of SSR endeavours in the context of 
developing or transitional countries. Moreover, the actual political will and commitment of local 
authorities to push for reforms is required to establish a viable and sustained local approach to 
community-oriented policing. Finally, external reform programmes need to be adjusted to the 
respective country context. This requires international donors not only to manage their expecta-
tions on a frictionless implementation phase but also to be more flexible in their approaches to 
reform.
International Police Reform Initiatives in the 
Context of SSR
The concept of SSR gained prominence during the 1990s within the  thematic areas of  development 
and policy as well as within academia. The most frequently cited definition of SSR is the rather 
broad approach by the OECD-Development Assistance  Committee,8 which includes, apart from 
the traditional security actors and established political institutions, also non-state actors as  central 
actors in SSR. According to the OECD-DAC, SSR comprises the establishment of  sustained, 
 transparent, and accountable rule of law-based and legitimate and civilian-led national security 
governance that is guided along democratic norms and principles.9 Meanwhile, the UN’s  definition 
of SSR10 holds to lead the way by stressing the indispensable importance of national ownership, 
the necessary support for national reform efforts by inter national actors, and a comprehensive 
approach to reform, both in technical as well as political terms.
The concept, originally based on traditional security and development studies as well as civil-
military relations, soon evolved into an important framework for reform initiatives within the 
security sectors of developing countries as part of the overall liberal peace and good governance 
paradigm.11 Externally driven and implemented SSR measures therefore included comprehen-
sive institutional reform and restructuring programmes of national security sector governance 
architectures in transitional and developing countries. These measures particularly aimed at the 
establishment of legitimate civilian control of the national security sector and a professionaliza-
tion of the national security actors in line with the SSR agenda. Hence, an important step in course 
of the reform process is the establishment of an oversight function on behalf of legitimate civil-
ian representatives over the main relevant security sector institutions and organizations. These 
are, in general, the line ministries of the interior, justice, defence, foreign affairs, and finance as 
well as corresponding committees. Moreover, independent oversight bodies such as the ombuds- 
institution or national non-governmental organizations, human rights groups, and research insti-
tutions can play a decisive role in oversight management.12
How to cite this book chapter:
Kocak, D. 2018. Rethinking Community Policing in International Police Reform: Examples from Asia. Pp. 3–9. 
London: Ubiquity Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5334/bcb.b. License: CC-BY 4.0
4 Rethinking Community Policing in International Police Reform
While reform initiatives are ideally triggered through the relevant ministries, reforms do also aim 
explicitly at the main executive institutions such as the national police, the national military as well as 
the national intelligence agencies and affiliated institutions. Main reform initiatives comprise the revi-
sion of national doctrines, laws, and decrees that are relevant to the security sector and the overall polit-
ical constitution. Moreover, internal control mechanisms within each relevant executive institution aim 
at more transparent and accountable self-control of the respective security actors to ensure rule of law-
based and human rights oriented courses of action.13 Apart from overall institutional reform initiatives, 
comprehensive training and support of local members of parliament as well as of ministry officials is 
essential to ensure necessary professional expertise on matters of security governance, a topic that is in 
many developing and transitional countries still a domain of security actors and their associates only.14
Capacity building as part of SSR endeavours is vital to ensure a sustained and continued transforma-
tion of the security sector. Capacity building measures, however, should not be simply equated with 
train-and-equip programmes, a strategy often used by the USSR or the USA during the Cold War to 
ensure military capabilities on behalf of their respective proxies in developing countries.15 Moreover, 
technical and operational capacity building needs to be embedded into an overarching reform pro-
gram that ensures an interlink between normative institutional reform along the lines of SSR  principles 
and technical or operational abilities of the local security forces. Neglecting institutional reform while 
delivering operational training only will admittedly lead to a more effective security actor in terms of 
improved tactical abilities but may also result, in the worst case, in increased abuse of power.16
Rather, capacity building measures, particularly for national police forces, are an important tool 
not only to establish a functioning police who are able to perform day-to-day policing tasks but 
also to ensure that the objectives of democratic governance are actually implemented and followed 
within the organizational apparatus. Training in human resources management, for instance, helps 
to professionalize the bureaucratic capabilities by establishing databases and archives on officer’s 
personnel files, and expedites overall organizational development. Capacity building in this area 
enables the HR section and the police command to facilitate performance reviews on a regular 
basis, to file entries on complaints or misconduct of police officers, and therefore leads, ideally, 
to improved oversight, and to a more disciplined and law-abiding police corps. As for another 
area, assets management and procurement are relevant to monitor the police budget and to pre-
vent instances of misappropriation, excessive spending, or corruption. Hence, a professional asset-
management unit will contribute to increased accountability and transparency of police spending. 
Moreover, professional asset management ensures that the procurement policies are in line with the 
police’s annual action plans and the general strategic planning.17 In short, capacity building is an 
important part of democratic governance programming due to the fact that it supports the police’s 
institutional functioning and facilitates the implementation of SSR inherent norms and values.18
Finally, since SSR is more than technical support but aims at one of the most sensitive and con-
tested domains of national sovereignty, the state’s monopoly on the use of force and the control 
over the national security actors, SSR is without doubt a political task. Moreover, the SSR agenda is 
clearly motivated along Western liberal norms and values as well as along democratic principles of 
policy making.19 Therefore, implementing SSR constitutes a veritable challenge to SSR program-
mers and practitioners since the local realities and political conditions in a given mission coun-
try might contradict the very foundations of SSR inherent norms of democratic governance and 
principles of human rights. And undeniably, SSR may be a tightrope walk for local reformers and 
external practitioners alike due to the challenge of harmonizing normative and ethical guidelines 
of SSR with the realities, and often confined spaces for action, in the respective countries.
SSR Initiatives and Local Ownership
As empirical evidence suggests after almost two decades of SSR, sustained implementation of 
intended SSR initiatives in developing and transitional countries requires first and foremost the 
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genuine support of the national political leadership,20 a fact which has been recently reiterated by 
the United Nations Security Council Resolutions on SSR and on international police units as part 
of UN missions.21
The existence of local ownership, the actual political will and aspiration on behalf of the local 
political leadership to support and to advance initiated reform attempts, is essential to success and 
sustained political change.22 This means in practical terms that local actors have a determining 
influence on the outline, programming, implementation, and evaluation of reform activities in 
their respective countries.23 While the idea of local ownership sounds convincing in theory, the 
actual realization of local ownership faced several difficulties on behalf of the external and the 
local actors alike. In fact, several cases of SSR unveiled the problem that the local political elite was 
not able to assert itself against external SSR programmers, either due to internal rivalries or due to 
a lack of profound political and technical expertise. Hence, reform initiatives were implemented 
by external actors without the actual support and substantial input of local decision makers. As a 
consequence, resistance or negligence on behalf of the local political leadership against the per-
ceived “imposed” reform programmes followed soon.24
Then there is also the question of who the most suited local counterpart actually is. For a reason, 
Lee and Özerdem25 point out that “the locals” are not a collective or uniform actor but consist out 
of myriad individuals driven by diverging political interests. Still there is an inconclusive debate 
about identifying local partners by external programmers to cooperate with. While the local polit-
ical elite seems to be the most appropriate and convenient counterpart in addressing questions 
of security sector-related reforms, there are also arguments about the necessity to include local 
non-governmental organizations and civil-society organizations to cover a broader political spec-
trum. In essence, approaching the local government that is generally interested in maintaining the 
political status quo will not necessarily bring the anticipated will for change.26
Moreover, there are also empirical cases where there is a strong local ownership driven by 
their own ideas about the purpose and direction of SSR initiatives. As the study of police reform 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina by Muehlmann27 indicates, local partners do not always share the fun-
damental values and norms of good security governance, but rather make use of foreign-trained 
and foreign-supported local police forces for personal and financial interests.28 Even addressing 
local NGOs, CSOs, or customary elites to forestall potential misuse of funds and resources by 
established local political elites might not bring the aimed-for reliable partner in SSR initiatives. 
Rather, complex local political rivalries and grievances could not only inhibit SSR programming 
but also lead to renewed hostilities. Moreover, local political elites as well as NGOs or customary 
elites could pursue reforms that run counter to the donor’s expectations of good governance and 
human rights.29 Therefore, Albrecht30 correctly notes that local ownership of externally initi-
ated reforms only occurs if the local decision makers do not perceive the reform initiatives as a 
threat towards their long-term political and personal interests and if they agree with the reform 
agenda.
The Centrality of Police Reform in SSR
In daily interactions with the community, the police are the most visible representation of the 
 government. The police are therefore the ultimate interface between a country’s citizens and 
 government. In this position, the police not only carry out the executive mandate but also act as 
mediator between different social groups and political factions. In short, the performance of the 
police is ultimately a display of the state’s political and social agenda. Since the police are such an 
important domestic actor in terms of security provision, social mediation, and ideally, being a role 
model for the population regarding the protection of civic norms and values, reforming the police 
along the principles of good governance is a major aim of international police reform initiatives in 
developing and transitional countries.31
6 Rethinking Community Policing in International Police Reform
International peacekeeping missions with considerable contingents of police units under the 
guidance of the United Nations increased dramatically since the end of the Cold War. The conflict 
scenarios of the 1990s reflected a changing geopolitical environment and, as a consequence, a dif-
ferent kind of conflict. Henceforward, the UN peacekeeping unit’s tasks were not the monitoring 
of ceasefires between warring states and national militaries anymore, but containing civil wars and 
large-scale internal conflicts between warring alliances of warlords, militias, and governmental 
forces in fragile states.32 These “new wars”33 often resulted in a partial or even complete breakdown 
of state structures and governance provisions, such as the collapse of the local security sector. 
Realizing the changed geopolitical challenges, the international community reformulated its over-
all programmatic commitment through Boutros-Ghali’s “Agenda for Peace” as well as the Brahimi 
report on how to respond to these kinds of conflicts.34
Since then, international police units, alongside the established “blue helmet” forces and under 
the guidance of the United Nations, were deployed to fill the security vacuum in a given country 
and tasked with rebuilding basic security structures in line with the international liberal peace 
and good governance agenda.35 In contrast to the traditional deployment of “blue helmet” military 
units, the deployment of international police components facilitated an overall diversification of 
the mission’s operation strategies, made them more flexible, and, as Call and Barnett36 put it, cre-
ated a “second generation of peacekeeping”. Hence, the police are ideally trained for communica-
tion and day-to-day interaction with the local population; a skill set which regular military units 
usually do not possess.37 This close contact on a daily basis between the multinational police and 
the local population would enable the United Nations police officers to promote the pluralist and 
liberal democratic values in the host country, ideally.38
However, these new deployments and tasks for multinational police contingents brought insti-
tutional as well as programmatic challenges and shortcomings to light: Being responsible for 
security provision, training, and mentoring the local police forces, United Nations Police con-
tingents soon became overstretched in regards to technical expertise and the ability to actually 
train their local counterparts. Most important, however, a defined understanding of what kind 
of approach to policing should actually be implemented by the United Nations Police was miss-
ing. Official guidelines for multinational police units as part of UN peacekeeping missions were 
not established before 2000.39 The then-formulated “democratic policing” – or interchangeably 
used “community-oriented policing” as an envisaged policing approach in the respective mission 
 countries40 – proved to be a rather vaguely defined ideal conception than an applicable model for 
police reform in fragile environments.41 While the importance of the international police units 
as part of the United Nations missions has been recently substantiated by the United Nations 
Security Council Resolutions 2151 and 2185 in 2014,42 and a community-oriented approach to 
policing has been reiterated as the envisaged policing approach, an actual definition of what this 
community-oriented approach actually entails is still missing.
Rethinking “Democratic Policing”
Assuming that there is a basic model of policing in contemporary democracies which ultimately 
rests on the Peelian metropolitan policing,43 Bayley, among others, presented an ideal type of polic-
ing in democratic societies. Contrary to existing debates about pros and cons of centralised or 
decentralised organisational police models and their respective ability or inability to allow effec-
tive and democratically oriented policing, Bayley highlights the actual implementation of policing 
on the ground and the daily interactions of police officers with the citizens as a possible indicator 
to measure democratic policing. There are four cornerstones of democratic policing: To act in 
accordance with the rule of law, to respect the universal human rights, to adhere to trans parency 
and accountability, and to understand policing as a service of the police towards its citizens.44
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Policing according to the rule of law prevents arbitrary actions of police officers and simulta-
neously ensures that the police act according to fixed principles of law.45 Rule of law by itself, 
however, does not guarantee the protection of citizens from police abuse of power, as Call and 
Bayley argue.46 Therefore, not only rule of law principles should guide the police’s behaviour but 
also principles of fundamental human rights. Furthermore, transparency and accountability of the 
police towards the political leadership and the respective population are necessary to strengthen 
trust of the population in the police force as well as to enable a comprehensive legitimate civilian 
control over the national police.47 Finally, it is important that the national police are an inherent 
part of the state and act accordingly as a partner and service agency for the collective good of the 
people and public security. To achieve this end, the police should approach the public through 
various channels of communication and thereby generate public trust.48
The idea of a universal democratic policing model, however, faced resistance from several schol-
ars since the devised term “democratic policing” might appear as just another label for already 
established policing practices and, furthermore, bears with the politically charged term “demo-
cratic” a clear normative and exclusive connotation.49 In this vein, Sklansky50 also points to the fact 
that the definition of “democracy” has a huge range and is also subject to a specific generational 
and historical understanding.
Similarly, there are conceptual misunderstandings in the common assumption which uncondi-
tionally links democratic policing to community policing51 such as the OSCE does in its “Guide-
book on Democratic Policing”.52 Community policing indisputably entails theoretical origins 
and many elements similar to democratic policing. However, for that reason alone, community 
policing is still ambiguously and inconclusively defined, a problem that even the OSCE admits.53 
Moreover, the interrelated fact that community policing techniques are also utilized by authoritar-
ian governments to establish comprehensive surveillance and control of their citizens for the sake 
of state security should provide ample food for thought.54
However, the proposed theorizing on “core policing” by Bayley and Perito55 might strike a 
middle course to the normatively charged terminology of “democratic policing” and “commu-
nity policing”. The authors argue that core policing constitutes first and foremost a certain state 
of mind as to a service-oriented and impartial police organization. This service orientation of 
the police manifests itself in three overarching guidelines: “being available”, “being helpful”, and 
“being fair and respectful”.56 Displaying approachability and the willingness to take security con-
cerns of the citizens seriously is essential to gain trust and confidence within the communities. 
Helpfulness of the police towards the communities, even in stressful situations, fosters the peo-
ples’ belief in the ethical and rule-based working attitude of the police officers. Finally, fairness 
and respectful interaction of the police, regardless of social standing, ethnicity, or gender, with 
the communities displays a service attitude towards the greater common good of a society. Unsur-
prisingly, Bayley and Perito refer to the similarities between core policing and community polic-
ing. However, they also stress the necessity of establishing the police officers’ mindset according 
to the principles of core policing first before aiming at more complex ideational concepts such as 
 community  policing.57
While the service orientation towards society on behalf of the police and police impartiality 
are basic requirements for plural policing, necessary development of police capabilities, standard 
operational procedures, and police management would help to complement the overall profes-
sional police development in transitional and post-conflict countries.
A Conceptual Framework on Adaptation Processes in Police Reform Scenarios
Referring back to existing research on governance transfers, exchanges – both of an ideational 
or material kind – between different cultures are a common pattern of transnational and global 
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interaction whereby transfers were not only unidirectional from north to south but multidirec-
tional.58 One of many examples for multidirectional influences is, for instance, the Royal Irish 
Constabulary (RIC), which has been adjusted according to the policing experiences in the British 
colonies.59 Martin Thomas describes the general colonial policing approach as a “hybrid” blend 
consisting of metropolitan, colonial, as well as customary forms of local policing.60 In fact, adapta-
tion processes, as Rinke et al.61 argue, were born out of necessity to actually implement external 
concepts and norms in colonial settings. Without the ability to adjust to the respective context, 
external actors would have not been able to assert their rule at all.
Before approaching present day challenges to police reform on a theoretical level and reflecting 
about adaptation and resistance processes, though, it makes sense to consider Crewe’s62 findings 
on adaption, conflict, and resistance: First, there is much more than plain success or apparent 
failure in interaction processes between groups or individuals. Second, resistance or noncompli-
ance are not necessarily displayed in violent behaviour or open hostilities but may also come in 
disguise. Third, Crewe cautions that the absence of open rebellion or resistance does not necessar-
ily mean that an introduced system is actually supported or even accepted by the receiving side.63
Several authors writing on police reform in transitional or post-conflict countries applied the 
terms “adaptation” and “resistance” to describe difficulties between external and local actors dur-
ing the actual reform processes.64 Uildriks and van Reenen, for instance, argue that the local police 
in their discussed case study had the choice to either resist externally proposed reform programs 
or to adapt to them in order to have an impact on the future policing approach.65 While these 
descriptive accounts on adaptation and resistance processes in police reform scenarios make a lot 
of sense, it appears necessary to make use of a theory-led conceptual framework.66 Inductive rea-
soning and theory building will expand our knowledge on interactions between external and local 
actors in the course of police reform initiatives and might even answer to the still-inconclusive 
debate on local ownership.
The transfer and adaptation process initially starts when an unfamiliar concept is presented 
by external actors to local actors. This is followed by an adaptation process executed through a 
local and/or an external agency. It is important to note that the adaptation process means that the 
erstwhile unfamiliar concept passes a process of transformation. This adjustment to the local con-
text and environment is necessary to establish points of intersection between external and local 
paradigms of thought and action. Without the adaptation process to the local context, the concept 
would remain meaningless to the local actors and would be therefore neglected. But contrary to 
earlier accounts on transfer processes, the willingness of the receivers to adapt is not necessarily 
bound to material incentives only. Rather, the prospect of expanding technical knowledge and 
courses of action are in many cases motivation enough to incorporate new concepts into their own 
repertoire.67 The adaptation process of the new concept on behalf of the local actors alters its con-
tent and scope, without a doubt. This however, is a necessary step during the adaptation process 
which enables the respective actors to reinterpret the concept along local paradigms of thought 
and action. This adaptation process to the local context particularly enables the involved actors to 
apply an otherwise inapplicable concept.68
The developed conceptual framework will not only help to answer the initial research questions, 
but will also enable us to analyse, reflect, and understand transfers of policing paradigms across 
national and cultural boundaries. Using the lens of adaptation, resistance, and reinterpretation 
with regard to police reform in past and present scenarios will yield new insights of when and how 
SSR and good governance initiatives might eventually thrive.
Methodologically, the paper draws on a small-N design, and the case selection for chapter three 
and four of the paper rests on a nominal and focussed comparison. Following the logic of J.S. 
Mill’s causal inference and method of agreement, the paper’s cross-case analysis enables us to 
compare and to contrast selected cases in order to learn about necessary causes and conditions 
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for community policing.69 Therefore, cases of Imperial and post-war Japan, Singapore, and Timor-
Leste are deliberately chosen to contrast, illustrate, and exemplify results of police reform and, in 
particular, the local implementation strategies of various strands of community policing.
It becomes clear, that the independent variable “local ownership”, or rather, “the existence of 
local ownership” is crucial for the implementation process, which is hereafter operationalized as 
dependent variable (“adaptation” or “reinterpretation”), of different philosophical and technical 
variants of community policing in the treated cases, whereas other potentially significant vari-
ables, such as the political system in the respective country or the respective historical timeframe 
in which the transfer took place, can be ruled out.
The paper is based on secondary literature, policy reports, legislative texts, and resolutions. Fur-
thermore, insights from qualitative semi-structured interviews with police officers, inter national 
police advisers, UN officials, and representatives of NGOs serve as additional sources for the 
empirical case studies. The interviews were conducted between 2011 and 2015, and the identity of 
the interview partners has been, by request, anonymized.
The paper is structured as follows: The second chapter presents and discusses contemporary 
approaches to and varieties of community policing. The third chapter traces the frequently cited 
but often neglected historical origins of community policing – the 19th century British metro­
politan policing and the koban policing of Imperial and post-war Japan. This is followed by the 
fourth chapter, which deals with international transfers of community policing in the recent past 
and discusses the implementation of community-oriented approaches to policing in Singapore 
and in Timor-Leste. Chapter five finally discusses the case studies’ main findings, provides answers 
to the initial research questions, and concludes with several recommendations.

Situating Community Policing in Contemporary 
Approaches to Public Order
As a consequence of deteriorated police-citizen relations in the course of the peace movement 
and mass demonstrations against police brutality as well as against continued  discriminatory 
practices of police officers against members of ethnic minorities during the 1970s, police 
 commissioners and politicians were, as Bayley and Shearing put it, “desperately searching for new 
approaches”.70
The main idea of community policing rests on the attempt to leave behind purely reactive and 
traditional approaches to policing. Since a reactive approach to policing is, according to  Alderson, 
not conducive to policing in a democratic political system due to the fact that it  creates a  particular 
distance between the police and the citizens since a contact and communicative exchange takes 
place only in cases of emergency, a proactive form of policing and a fundamental and  trustful 
cooperation between the police and the population is intended to establish public security 
and societal peace. Furthermore, a community-oriented and proactive approach to policing 
would find appropriate and well-suited means to protect the respective residents according to 
their needs. 71
Through active and continued communication with the local residents, so the argument goes, 
the police would be able to identify the most pressing problems of the respective neighbourhood 
and try to cooperatively find workable and sustained solutions. The established reactive approach 
to policing relied heavily on patrol cars, and therefore led to a social alienation between the police 
and the communities since the police became unapproachable by the public. By contrast, pro-
ponents of community policing highlighted the importance of foot patrols by police officers to 
show police presence on the streets and to enable the residents to approach the police officers 
with their concerns. Foot patrols therefore appeared as a feasible technique to regain the trust of 
the residents in the police and to simultaneously enable police officers to learn about the residents 
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living in their assigned working districts. These confidence-building measures of the police are 
particularly targeted at ethnic minorities since these members of society have suffered the most 
from police brutality and discriminatory practices by the police in the past.72
The idea of implementing a more community-oriented approach to policing in the UK was 
a reaction to the shattered relations between the police and communities during the 1970s. 
As opposed to the existing reactive approach to policing in the UK, Alderson reasoned about 
 improving police-community relations through a proactive service attitude of the police toward 
the communities. Hence, he outlined principles for an aspired approach to rule-based and 
 indiscriminate policing: “To contribute towards liberty, equality and fraternity in human affairs; 
to help reconcile freedom with security and to uphold the rule of law; to facilitate the achievement 
of human dignity through upholding and protecting human rights and the pursuit of happiness; 
to contribute towards the creation of reinforcement of trust in communities; to strengthen the 
security and the feeling of security of persons and property; and to investigate, detect and activate 
the prosecution of offences within the rule of law.”73 Policing, as Alderson continues, is essential to 
safeguarding the people’s freedom, physical security, and to protecting them from fear.74 It should 
be noted that the essence of Alderson’s envisaged policing principles corresponds with the  concept 
of human security as well as the conviction that policing in a liberal-democratic society is a 
common good.75
The notion of a necessary realignment of policing in liberal-democratic societies was  reiterated 
by the Scarman Report of 1981.76 The Scarman Report was based on an investigation on the 
causes of the so-called Brixton Riots. The report’s main findings revolved around the need to 
readjust the British police’s robust and discriminatory policing and to transform it towards a 
more  service-oriented approach to policing, particularly towards ethnic minorities in socially 
deprived areas. Lord Scarman identified particularly the disturbed community-police relations 
as a  barrier to prevent outbursts of violence such as the Brixton Riots, and therefore highlighted 
the  importance of consensual cooperation between the communities and the police and increased 
lines of communication.77
Hence, as a reaction to the Brixton Riots and the concomitant Scarman Report, approaches 
to community-oriented policing by Alderson78 and the “multi-agency approach” by Newman79 
became a viable alternative to the heretofore predominant reactive policing in the UK.80 Aiming 
at increased police-community consultation to prevent and fight crime, the approach of  proactive 
community-oriented and multi-agency policing also deemed to improve shattered police-
community relations in the long run.81 Since then, community policing has been increasingly 
publicized and advertised in the United States of America and other Western countries as the 
most suitable approach to strengthening the communities’ trust into the police and to promote 
police-citizen partnerships.
Community policing was soon labelled by police officials and politicians as the “sole  alternative”82 
not only to overcome the loss of trust of the people into the police and to reconcile the problematic 
police-citizen relations in an ethnic heterogeneous and politically pluralist country, but also to 
decrease the high incidence of crime in the United States. The increasing popularity of community 
policing, however, diluted its actual theoretical and normative substance. Original forms of 
 community policing were traced back by community policing proponents to the metropolitan 
policing, introduced by Sir Robert Peel in Britain in the 19th century and to the Japanese koban 
policing. Both, the metropolitan policing as well as the koban policing were deemed to be based 
on a close and trustful relationship between the police and the population.
Since the 1990s, the majority of the communal police stations in the United States officially 
introduced community policing into their work.83 Moreover, this advertised new approach to 
policing allowed police commissioners and academics to receive research funds or support money 
for facilitating community policing through expert assessments or the visible implementation 
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of community policing elements into the actual police service, as Carter and Manning state.84 
In fact, as part of the emerging trend to publicly advertise community policing as the most suitable 
tool to overcome the distorted relations between the police and ethnic minorities, and to decrease 
the high crime rates in many American cities, a great number of police commissioners established 
community policing programmes and special units responsible for community policing in the 
respective municipalities. According to Mastrofski85, having necessary electoral support in mind 
during the coming elections, these publicly advertised innovations should give the impression 
that the respective political administration and police leadership is open to new approaches and 
amicable police-community relations.
Establishing special police units and departments for the purpose of conducting community 
policing within the respective municipalities, however, appears to be unrewarding. Community 
policing is not only a technique but also a specific philosophy and mindset of how to approach 
underlying causes for social conflict, violence, and poverty, of how to treat and how to police 
the population in line with the principles of fundamental human rights, non-discriminatory 
 behaviour towards ethnic, religious, and sexual diversity, and a sound understanding of the rule 
of law.  Therefore, ideally this particular mindset of community policing needs to be guiding 
the actions of every police officer in the respective police station to trigger a change of police 
 behaviour and practices. However, insulating community policing in special police units or 
departments runs counter to the actual idea of reforming the police according to principles of 
community policing. Moreover, following different approaches of policing within a single police 
station, as some observers caution,86 may lead to parallel policing realities for the police officers 
and, at worst, to conflicts and rivalries about the “real” approach to policing. Still, police work 
is  generally  perceived as acting in suspense-packed and physically challenging situations and 
is frequently linked to ideas about transfigured masculinity. While popular narratives on the 
police culture hold that “true” police work would enable male police officers to prove their 
 virility,  administrative activities and “softer” forms of police work such as communication-based 
engagement with the public is often described as boring and linked to “effeminate” attributes and 
behaviour.87
Community policing is not limited to close contacts between the police and residents only, 
such as approachable police officers walking the beat, house visits, or police-community  meetings. 
Rather, following a community-oriented approach of policing means a thorough reform and 
transformation of the police and the way they perceive and protect the community.
Since community policing sets its focus on proactive engagement with the public and there-
fore entails the ability of the police officer to mediate and communicate reasonably with her or 
his respective counterpart, this “soft policing” approach faces resistance from police officers as 
well. Particularly the strand of research on police culture88 mainly argues that police practices 
and the behaviour of police officers towards citizens do not solely follow formal guidelines but 
are also influenced by informally passed-on experiences, attitudes, and mindsets among the peer 
group of police officers.89 Due to the fact that these very informal rules of action do have a major 
effect on police officers’ behaviour towards citizens, the setup of community policing units alone is 
futile. Rather, implementing community policing starts first and foremost with a mindset change 
of the police officers and their idea of policing, encompassing all echelons of the institution.90 
In  theory, this should be followed by altered operation schedules and strategies, a decentralized 
police  structure, and enhanced discretionary powers for the police officers on the beat.
Voiced criticism on the community policing approach within the police revolves mainly around 
the perceived non-applicability of purely communication-based policing techniques in the daily 
life of police officers on the street.91 Others claim that these “soft” approaches to  policing are 
 unrewarding and would not be equivalent to actual police work.92 Finally, a main reason for 
 resistance against community policing techniques is the outspoken scepticism on behalf of many 
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police officers towards policing concepts and approaches that stem from the desks of police 
bureaucrats, politicians, and academics.93
While the concept of community policing is generally supported within academia, it is rather 
the misuse and the definitional ambiguity of the community policing concept which  encouraged 
several authors94 in their criticism on the excessive increase of domestic and international 
calls for police reform along the lines of community policing. Lyons95, for instance, conducted 
research on police-citizen partnerships in Seattle. His main findings suggest that in many cases 
of  police-citizen cooperation schemes, information sharing flows rarely bi-directional but rather 
unidirectional, from the citizens to the police, indeed, revealing a relatively passive community 
policing engagement on behalf of the police. Moreover, the increasing ethnic, social, and religious 
heterogeneity of American urban areas complicates the identification of a common threat 
 perception and articulation. This, of course, raises the question of who the actual “citizen 
 counterpart” for the police is. According to Lyons,96 the police in Seattle identified the local 
 chamber of commerce as the sole citizen counterpart while neglecting to include several well-
organized local civil society organizations. The police-citizen cooperation was therefore limited to 
a selected, small, exclusive, and rather wealthy segment of Seattle’s population.
Consequences of these practices of unilaterally chosen partners might lead to a prioritization 
of security needs and expectations for a small, potentially rather homogeneous, and wealthier 
part of the society. Simultaneously, deprived areas with rather higher crime rates might easily 
get into the focus of hot-spot policing. Hence, policing along ethnic profiling or style of clothing 
are  determining whether one would get into the focus of police measures or not. While these 
very residential areas particularly might need communication-based and community-oriented 
policing strategies the most, heavy-handed policing strategies conducted by police task forces 
impede police-citizen communication on equal footing.97 Moreover, as Dixon98 argues, if one 
would understand community policing as a policing approach that tackles the most acute security 
threats in a respective community, each and any policing strategy, from preventive “soft policing” 
to reactive or militarized policing could be designated as community policing.
Kraska99 especially criticises the militarisation of the police in the United States under the 
 pretext of the “community policing” label: Regular raids by heavily armed SWAT units as well as 
patrols in armoured vehicles with random stop-and-frisk searches of residents in branded hot-
spot areas are far more easy to justify to the public if these very measures are connected to a 
designated community-safety programme. Instead of trying to be approachable to the residents in 
need, the highly armed appearance of the police rather disturbs police-community relations even 
more, as he argues.
Varieties of Community Policing
Several approaches to policing have been associated with community-oriented policing so far. 
Broken-windows policing, zero-tolerance policing, and problem-oriented policing are, among 
others, regarded as varieties of community-oriented policing strategies. While all listed styles of 
policing generally engage with the community, there are still differences regarding their normative 
and disciplinary approaches regarding the community as well as to what extent the communities 
are actually involved in the provision of security.
Broken-windows policing spread across the United States during the 1980s and has been mainly 
inspired by a seminal article by Wilson and Kelling100 on strategies of how to overcome diffuse 
fear of crime. The authors refer to the metaphor of a broken window to explain the increasing 
urban dilapidation in combination with rising criminality and insecurity. Wilson and Kelling 
 hypothesize that if a windowpane is broken and no one repairs it soon, remaining windows of 
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the same  building will be broken as well since the apparent lack of maintenance might lead to the 
conclusion that breaking windows of that building will have no consequences for the respective 
perpetrators at all. Moreover, if, as the argument of Wilson and Kelling continues, the absence 
of consequences and an associated lawlessness remain for these kinds of delinquencies, defiance 
of the law will increase and spill over to the whole neighbourhood. As a reaction, the authors 
conclude, average citizens will increasingly generate diffuse fear of crime on the streets and 
move away to safer places in the city. The neighbourhood in question, however, will sooner or 
later be lost.101
Using the example of Newark, New Jersey, in the United States, Wilson and Kelling102  suggest 
that the reintroduction of foot patrols by the police admittedly did not lead to a decrease of 
crime in the respective city districts. However, their research indicated that residents generated 
an increased feeling of security and felt more encouraged to intervene in cases of vandalism or 
petty crime, having in mind those police officers walking the beat. What is more, the regularly 
conducted beat patrols enabled the police officers to get to know the respective city district, its 
residents, and potential troublemakers. Simultaneously, on behalf of the residents there appeared 
to be a growing awareness that criminal activity and vandalism would immediately be pursued 
and punished by the police officers in place. In conclusion, the authors argue that the  introduction 
of patrol cars had the effect that police officers became inaccessible to the residents. However, 
sustained police presence through foot patrol in the city districts would foster better police-citizen 
relationships and an increased feeling of security on behalf of the residents.103
The broken-windows thesis that vandalism and disorder leads to an increase of crime has been 
disputed within the research community. Moreover, it has been objected that particularly  ethnic 
minorities would disproportionally and unjustifiably become labelled as “troublemakers” and 
therefore targeted by police officers while following the broken-windows approach.104 Moreover, 
adolescents, members of ethnic minorities, or homeless persons could become criminalized by 
spending time in areas designated for public use since loitering might be perceived as disorderly 
behaviour. Hence, implementing the broken-windows approach might lead to an immense loss 
of trust into the actual objectivity and impartiality of the police on behalf of the affected citizens. 
While the broken-windows approach seems plausible in theory, implementing it would require 
a highly professional and impartial police force. Otherwise, the proactive character of broken-
windows policing could turn quite quickly into repressive policing similar to the zero-tolerance 
approach.105
This zero-tolerance policing is subsumed by Burke106 as a proactive and assertive policing 
 concept, having its theoretical underpinnings in the broken-windows approach. In contrast to the 
broken-windows thesis of Wilson and Kelling, however, zero-tolerance policing aims not only to 
reduce the diffuse feeling of insecurity on behalf of the residents, but also to reduce  criminality 
in the long run. Within criminological theory, policing in New York City is widely regarded as 
 paramount example for zero-tolerance policing when the then-mayor Giuliani heralded the 
start of a rigorous prosecution of any kind of crime to contain the exuberant crime rates in 
the  metropolis during the late 1990s.107 Hard-line policing of any petty offense aimed therefore at 
calling a halt to a normalization of existing law violation in everyday life and at bringing criminals 
to justice. One of the main objectives of zero-tolerance policing was also to discourage any poten-
tial copycat from engaging in criminal activities.108 Similar to the community policing narrative, 
zero-tolerance policing proponents claim that this policing approach is backed up by the majority 
of residents and covers the very security needs of its respective community. In fact, the rigorous 
policing against any form of crime according to the zero-tolerance approach enjoyed popularity 
and was received favourably in wide areas of New York City.
However, Lum,109 among others, cautions that zero-tolerance policing might also lead to 
a  normalization of inappropriate behaviour by police officers, such as harsh treatment of 
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citizens, which might often be disproportional to the respective offence. This behaviour of police 
officers towards citizens might not be desirable in a political pluralist country. And while Knights110 
admits that zero-tolerance policing might have public appeal by reducing crime rates, he doubts 
the long-term effectiveness of this approach. Tackling underlying social causes for  criminal 
 behaviour and establishing sustained lines of communication between the police and residents 
will not be achieved through hard-line policing alone, as he argues. Rather, zero-tolerance 
 policing might sooner or later lead to cleavages along social and ethnic lines of society. Again, as 
Taylor111 concurs, zero-tolerance policing will, at the end of the day, benefit the wealthier parts of 
society, while ethnic minorities, adolescents, and the socially weaker parts of society get into the 
focus of policing measures.
In contrast to the broken-windows approach and zero-tolerance policing, problem-oriented 
policing (POP) rests on problem-centred analysis, the investigation, and eventually, the  settling 
of causes related to criminality. Goldstein112 is regarded as one of the forward thinkers of this 
approach to policing. Criticizing the established reactionary patterns of policing by stating 
that they do not match the realities of contemporary democratic heterogeneous  societies, 
Goldstein recommended combining the established tools of policing with active and  sustained 
 police-citizen cooperation.113 The main tools for investigation and analysis of POP are the 
SARA-approach (Scanning, Analysis, Response, Assessment), and data-backed  triangulation.114 
With the help of this methodology, the police are able to generate criminal patterns and to 
 accumulate “hot spots” of criminality in urban areas. Additionally, established and trustful 
lines of  communication with the respective residents of a community are necessary to jointly 
address causes of social instability.
Depending on the respective investigation, different police strategies are devised to cope with 
the crime in question, ranging from preventive engagement of community-oriented  policing 
to repressive hard-line policing.115 Braga and Weisburd,116 for instance, specify “enforcement 
 problem-oriented policing” and “situational problem-oriented policing”. While the former approach 
includes targeted raids, increased car patrols in hot-spot areas, and random body searches of 
suspected individuals, situational problem-oriented policing includes rather “soft” police  measures 
such as public outreach, increased communication with local civil-society  organisations, and an 
increased harmonization of crime-prevention strategies with other relevant state and non-state 
actors such as youth welfare offices and private security companies.
Enjoying standard guidelines and flexibility in approaching diverse societal contexts with 
 adequate set of tools, problem-oriented policing appears to be founded on a sound  methodological 
basis and to be equipped with better-defined courses of action than the rather ambiguous 
“ community policing”.117 Braga and Weisburd118 nevertheless criticize that while POP seems 
to be promising in theory, enforcement problem-oriented policing often prevails over “softer” 
approaches to policing, and the strict compliance to the SARA guidelines are often neglected by 
police officers.
The Historical Origins of Community Policing in 
19th Century Britain and Imperial Japan
This chapter addresses the frequently cited historical origins of the contemporary community 
policing paradigm. The British metropolitan policing by Sir Robert Peel as well as the Japanese 
koban policing are regarded as the main sources of community policing in theoretical as well as 
in practical terms for contemporary community-based approaches to policing.119 Moreover, the 
Peelian police reform and the consequential British metropolitan policing are regarded as the 
foundation for modern policing.120
The paper explicitly takes the respective country context and its normative objectives of police 
reform into account. Therefore, discussing the British Metropolitan policing and the Imperial 
 Japanese koban policing does not intend to equate these political entities with each other. Due 
to the significance of the Metropolitan policing approach in modern policing, the Metropolitan 
policing approach serves as the main reference point for the subsequent variances of community 
policing approaches. While the Peelian police reform will be presented in the first part of this 
section, the second part takes a closer look at the Japanese koban and its development since 
the late 19th century in Japan. Finally, the last part of this chapter reflects on the creation and 
 development of koban policing in light of the theoretical framework. The chapter illustrates, 
and this is particularly true for the koban approach, that closely linked police-citizen relations and 
cooperation enabled the police to establish a comprehensive and complex surveillance system to 
uphold state security.
Metropolitan Policing in 19th Century London
The reform of the British police in the 19th century and its developed metropolitan policing 
model and basic organisational structure influenced police organisations around the globe. The 
 necessity to reform the British police in the early 19th century by Sir Robert Peel was  contingent 
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upon  substantial societal and economic transformation of the Victorian era. The increasing 
 urbanisation as part of the British industrialisation process brought new challenges to the existing 
order.121 The fast-growing urban settlements in Britain were not only accompanied by industrial 
development, wealth, and prosperity, but also by the development of slums and a rising crime rate. 
Soon doubts on the professional orientation and effectiveness of the traditional British police to 
cope with these changes gained weight within the British administration.
The new metropolitan police was more than just a crime-fighting agency; beyond maintaining 
public order, their assigned tasks revolved around extended dimensions of police work, such as 
the control and surveillance of the working class and migrated people from the British colonies. 
Hence, police work did not stop in front of the doorstep but found its way into the people’s homes 
to intervene in cases of alcohol abuse, domestic violence, and as behaviour that was perceived to 
be deviant from Puritan norms.122
The traditional British policing before the Peelian police reforms consisted generally out of 
untrained and underpaid men from the respective local municipality as well as of a multitude of 
private-security actors. Their main tasks were the protection and escorting of the local tax collec-
tor as well as haunting reported felonies. In addition, recruited residents had to act as “watchmen” 
by night or as “wards” by day to patrol the streets and detain perceived suspects. The rational 
bases for these executive actions were generally ad hoc decisions without a solid legal foundation. 
Frequently, male members of the communities were also called together through a mandatory 
hue and cry to apprehend a criminal suspect. Overall, the character of the traditional, primordial 
British policing can be described as ineffective and highly reactive since there was actually no 
rule-based and organized progressive and preventive crime-fighting strategy in place.123
The deployment of uniformed policemen who went in regular shifts on patrol in urban bor-
oughs should actively prevent crime. In contrast to the traditional policing, then-Home Secretary 
Sir Robert Peel aimed at a regulated and centralised policing model for Britain. Mayhall,124 among 
others, specified nine principles of Sir Robert Peel, which should guide the Metropolitan police in 
their daily work. A main focus of these very principles appears to be the premise of non-violence 
as part of the police service. The use of force, as the principles stated, should be the last resort. This 
aspiration of non-violence is grounded in the understanding that the police are a service for the 
people and not against the people. Moreover, the principle of rule-based policing should avoid any 
abuse of power by the Metropolitan police officers.125
Concerning the disciplinary regulations, Peel resorted to a military-disciplinary framework. 
However, unlike the military, the Peelian Metropolitan police did not carry lethal weapons during 
patrols.126 British politicians’ response was initially hostile to the idea of adopting military disci-
pline and military-like uniforms by the metropolitan police. Their main concern was that these 
measures would lead to a militarisation of the British police similar to the negatively perceived 
continental, and particularly absolutist French, policing model of the militarised Gendarmerie.127 
Most important, however, hitherto there wasn’t any known viable organizational model one could 
refer to except the military organisational structure. Additionally, the centralised military organi-
sational model was unique in its ability to effectively regulate an agency with executive powers and 
to prevent any deviations from the given rules of engagement.
The uniforms for the Peelian policemen were in so far a novelty as traditional policemen con-
ducted their work in plainclothes. To uniform the new police force, however, as Monkkonen128 
argues, was not a sign of exclusiveness or militarisation but a measure to make police officers 
highly visible and easily approachable by the population. Moreover, Peel’s recourse on the military 
structure as a role model for the new metropolitan police was actually not inspired by the idea to 
militarise the British police, as several authors argue.129 It also has to be noted that the Metropoli-
tan police was issued blue uniforms while the British military wore the traditional scarlet red coat. 
This indicated a clear distinction between the military and the police.130
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Irrespective of the resistance to his policing model, Peel, in his function as Home Secretary, 
brought the Metropolitan Police Act of 1829 into action. Soon, newly recruited metropolitan 
policemen patrolled the boroughs of London on a regular basis. While the number of newly 
recruited metropolitan policemen continuously rose, the Home Secretary opted for a temporary 
coexistence of traditional policemen, private security actors, and metropolitan police officers 
until 1840.131 From the 1830s onwards, the new metropolitan policing model expanded across the 
country. But despite the Rural Constabulary Act of 1839, which codified the Peelian police reform 
on the countryside, a nationwide implementation of the police reforms did not take place until 
the 1850s. Emsley132 explains this fragmentary implementation of police reforms with the unwill-
ingness of local mayors to cede control over local police forces. More important for the limited 
police reform, however, was the unwillingness of local policemen to adapt to the new conceptual 
orientation of the metropolitan policing towards a preventive and proactive style of policing. In 
many cases, traditional forms of reactive policing prevailed in Britain until the 1890s.
Koban Policing in Imperial Japan
The Western community policing approach has been frequently attributed to the Japanese koban 
policing. To date, the Japanese koban acts as prototype for successful community policing.133 In 
essence, koban policing stands for intensive communication and collaboration between the Japa-
nese police and citizens and is widely regarded as role model and inspiration for police-citizen 
partnership.
Due to the relatively low crime rates in Japan during the 1970s and 1980s, the Japanese polic-
ing approach has been internationally heralded as a role model for its assumed mutually trusting 
relationship between the police and the population.134 Bayley’s influential book Forces of Order: 
Police Behaviour in Japan and the United States135 is regarded as the initial spark for the inter-
national interest in the Japanese approach to policing. His well-cited book depicts the hitherto 
relatively unnoticed koban policing. According to Bayley, the responsiveness and friendliness of 
the Japanese koban officers constitutes the basis for an amicable relationship between the citizens 
and the police. Moreover, Bayley stressed the fact that koban officers do foot patrols on a regular 
basis, which enables them to get to know the respective neighbourhood and its residents. It is this 
constant but unobtrusive police presence on the streets that generates a feeling of safety and pro-
tection on behalf of the local residents, as Bayley concluded.136 Similar to Bayley’s book, Vogel137 
reported about the exceptionally low crime rates in Japan in comparison with other industrialized 
countries and identified koban policing as a main reason for this success in crime control. How-
ever, a long-time observer of Japanese society stressed even at that time the potential of misuse of 
power and widespread one-sided intelligence gathering of the Japanese police through its complex 
networks to neighbourhood associations and the neighbourhood police boxes known as koban.138
The origins of the koban policing approach date back to the Japanese Empire in the late 19th 
century. The demise of the Togukawa dynasty and the accession to power of Tenno Mutsuhito 
triggered an extensive modernisation of the Japanese Empire, known as Meiji reforms. Along-
side the centralisation and professionalization of the bureaucratic apparatus, the Japanese state-
building approach also encompassed a thorough reform and build-up of a police force following 
the example of European police institutions. The Japanese executive’s commitment to implement 
a Western policing approach in Imperial Japan was high; particularly influenced by the European 
continental policing model, the Japanese Interior Ministry sent officials to Europe but also invited 
French and German police advisors and practitioners to introduce and implement European 
conti nental policing strategies to the Japanese context.139 Relating to this, it is important to note 
that the Japanese police build-up was modelled on the British metropolitan policing insofar as the 
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Japanese police adapted the basic idea of a modernized police with a uniformed police corps act-
ing in line with an elaborated set of regulations. However, since the Japanese leadership aimed at 
a rigorous state-building agenda and a powerful police force to maintain state security during the 
far-reaching and comprehensive political and societal reform in Japan, it opted for the centralized 
and militarily shaped continental policing model, as Aldous140 stresses.
To enable the Japanese police to be present in every part of the country and to defend the state’s 
monopoly on the use of force, the Japanese Interior Ministry opted for the area-wide installation 
of police boxes. The installation of these boxes was inspired by the German concept of extensive 
social control through the police.141 While koban police boxes were mainly established in urban 
areas, chuzaisho police houses were installed in rural parts of the country as the functional equiva-
lent to koban boxes. Both the koban as well as the chuzaisho initially aimed at a thorough control 
and surveillance of the population and at a closer interaction between the stationed police offers 
with the nearby residents.142
Officers stationed in the koban boxes were tasked with assistance in emergency situations but 
acted also as first contact for residents in case of complaints and reports of criminal acts. More-
over, koban police officers registered every resident and regularly conducted mandatory house 
visits. During these house visits, residents had to provide detailed personal information such as 
their family status and occupation. While the police officers in the metropolitan areas were only 
assigned to work during shifts in the koban boxes, police officers on the countryside actually lived 
with their families in the chuzaisho. Similar to the koban officers, rural chuzaisho police officers 
had comprehensive knowledge on the personal living situations of every resident within their 
service area and conducted housing visits on a regular basis.143
An important feature of the internal security policy in the Japanese Empire was the politi-
cal and social dimension of policing: The immediate proximity of the police to the Japanese 
population through koban and chuzaisho enabled the police not only to represent and defend 
the state’s monopoly on the use of force but also to control the loyalty and subordination of the 
population to the Imperial political doctrine. In this vein Ramcharan144 emphasizes the deeply 
entrenched social hierarchical order and the paternalistic habitus of state officials, such as the 
police, towards the citizens. The above-mentioned conducted house visits on a regular basis 
by koban officers illustrate how far the surveillance actually went. In addition to the gathered 
information on the size of each household and the respective dwellers’ occupations, the police 
categorized each resident into a risk group and conducted profiling. While noblemen, land-
owners, as well as residents with decent professions were visited by koban officers only twice 
a year, residents who were perceived as a potential threat to state security as well as relatively 
poor people were visited every month by the police. Unemployed residents, former inmates, 
and politically active residents were visited three times a month.145 This comprehensive surveil-
lance and intelligence gathering by the Japanese police increased particularly during the Second 
World War since political activism and deviation from societal standards were perceived as a 
threat to the government.146
Of great importance for the police-citizen cooperation as part of koban policing are the Japa-
nese neighbourhood associations (tonari­gumi). These neighbourhood associations are deeply 
entrenched into the Japanese cultural history and date back to the 17th century. According to 
Aldous147 and Onda,148 the tonari­gumi acted as “auxiliary police” during the Second World War 
in mainland Japan. They were actively focussed on maintaining social order and identifying crit-
ics of the government within their neighbourhood and to report them to the state authorities. 
Although not a direct offspring of the tonari­gumi, post-war established Crime Prevention Asso­
ciations, organized by local businessmen in cooperation with the local police stations followed a 
similar strategy as the tonari­gumi and display the still-close relationship between the police and 
the population in Japan.149 These Crime Prevention Associations try to sensitize the respective 
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residents for potential criminal activities and to prevent crime through showing presence, atten-
tiveness, and even through instructing perceived wrongdoers in public.150
The post-war occupation of Japan by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) 
led to comprehensive reforms of the public service and state institutions. Apart from the Impe-
rial Military, the Japanese police system was considered by the American occupying forces as the 
epitome of the authoritarian und hierarchical Japanese Imperial mindset. Therefore, the SCAP 
initiated police reforms aimed at the decentralization of the police and a limitation of police pow-
ers. One point of criticism on the police’s sweeping powers was the detailed personal information 
each Japanese citizen had to reveal to the koban officers. However, despite the reform attempts 
and the targeted “democratization” of the Japanese police by the American occupying forces, the 
Japanese police force was able to maintain established practices and ideas of how to police the 
Japanese society. Still, social control, one-sided intelligence gathering, and tight surveillance, as 
Aldous151 argues, were among the primary duties of koban officers in post-war Japan. Moreover, 
changing geopolitical developments during the 1950s caused an end to the formal occupation of 
Japan by SCAP and enabled the Japanese police to regain their centralized structure just as in the 
pre-war period.152
Still, critical observers perceive the contemporary Japanese koban policing first and foremost as 
a surveillance tool to effectively control the population.153 While answering the koban household 
surveys is not mandatory anymore, Katzenstein and Tsujinaka154 argue that refusing to comply 
with koban officers might even appear suspicious to the police officers and arouse the police’s 
curiosity. Even if residents declined to answer the regular surveys, koban officers stationed nearby 
would be able to record movement profiles and additional information with the help of cooperat-
ing neighbours and community associations. Even non-resident visitors would be monitored and 
recorded by koban officers in case they were perceived as a potential threat to the community.155 
Moreover, neighbourhood gossip about unpopular residents who are not socially integrated into 
the neighbourhood community might also be forwarded to koban officers and appear on the 
records, fostering immense pressure on individualists.156 Furthermore, the gathered data on each 
resident is not exclusively kept in the local koban boxes but accessible to other state agencies in 
case a profile attracts attention and fits to perceived risk groups.157
The Japanese koban policing emerged during a phase of enormous social and political transfor-
mation. Traditional reactive police forces were not able to cope with the pace of societal develop-
ment and concomitant challenges regarding the operational area, nor did they have the necessary 
professional tools and knowledge. Moreover, the introduction of a modern police force in Impe-
rial Japan has been regarded on behalf of the political leadership as one of several epitomes of 
modern statehood. Hence, local ownership and commitment in supporting the reform of the 
police was crucial. As part of a modernization and state-building project, an effectively operating 
police organization was tasked with the provision of state security in rural and urban areas.
Ames’s quotation perfectly defines the theoretical underpinnings of this paper on adapta-
tion, reinterpretation, and resistance when he describes the Japanese koban policing as “blended 
amalgam of the authoritarian, powerful, and highly centralized prewar police system and the 
‘democratic’ and decentralized post-war system.”158 Hence, the Japanese koban is not a solely 
Japanese creation but an outcome of exactly the above-mentioned adaptation processes between 
external and local approaches to policing. The case study on the formation of koban policing in 
Japan therefore answers the initial research questions regarding the historical origins of com-
munity policing as well as the necessary conditions to establish a community-oriented approach 
to policing.
To become explicit: The implementation of foreign approaches to policing and the creation of 
koban policing as a very local approach to policing was driven by a strong local ownership and a 
clear political agenda. During an era in Japanese history with major socio-political transformations, 
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the Japanese political leadership actively sought for external or foreign modes of policing in order 
to maintain state security. The general modern concept of policing introduced by Peel through the 
metropolitan policing approach, as well as the highly centralized and bureaucratized continental 
approach to policing, fit the Japanese demand for effective regulated policing. Due to the existence 
of a strong local ownership and commitment on behalf of the Japanese political leadership, the 
external model was soon adapted and combined with the traditional Japanese hierarchical and 
paternalistic norms and values as well as with the traditional local cooperation patterns between 
the police and neighbourhood associations, the tonari­gumi, to expand the police’s surveillance 
capacities. Particularly this reinterpretation or alteration of an external concept on behalf of the 
local leadership to a very own concept, as De La Rosa159 and Draude160 describe it, eventually facil-
itate the implementation process in the local context. Moreover, the thorough implementation of 
a professional bureaucratic police system with rigidly minded rules and regulations enabled an 
unimpeded continuation of police development and practice in Japan.
Bringing the Community Policing Paradigm to 
Singapore and Timor-Leste
Conveying community policing approaches to post-conflict settings and countries in political 
transition became a prominent strategy by international development agencies and donor coun-
tries because community policing has been interpreted as a most suitable tool to overcome police 
brutality and human rights abuses by local security forces. Implementing the concept of commu-
nity policing, as the official narrative goes, would help the respective country to adopt an inter-
national best-practice approach to improve police-community relationships, and eventually, to 
foster societal peace.
Due to the propagated success of community policing in the United States and other Western 
countries, community policing became part of a political reform package for developing and tran-
sitional countries. According to Brogden,161 community policing had been uncritically presented 
as a particularly suitable tool for post-conflict and post-authoritarian societies in their attempts 
to leave behind the often brutal and inhuman policing practices of the former autocratic govern-
ments. Also, donor countries, the United Nations, and other international development agencies 
incorporated the theme of community policing into their programs and even advertised com-
munity policing as the “best-practice” to cope with rising crime rates in the respective transi-
tional countries.162 Moreover, as several authors163 add for consideration, development program 
funds were increasingly linked and even conditioned to the successful implementation of com-
munity policing into the national police structures of developing countries. The United Nations 
Transitional Administration in Timor-Leste (UNTAET), for instance, issued the implementation 
of community policing as a guiding policing principle in Timor-Leste for the to-be-established 
national police.164 The rationale behind this idea was Timor-Leste’s presumed cultural proximity 
to Japan and Singapore. The successful Implementation of community-oriented policing similar 
to the Japanese koban and the Singaporean community policing system (COPS) in an Asian coun-
try, so the assumption went, would be quite likely.165
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In the course of several years, an international network of community policing experts evolved. 
Private security companies and contractors such as DynCorp were assigned by the United Nations 
to conduct community policing training courses in several UN-mission countries.166 Despite the 
large pool of international experts, who were mostly recruited out of retired military and police-
men, as well as the comprehensive financial support to implement community policing in volatile 
contexts, guidance of how to actually implement community policing mainly rested on standard 
measures and recommendations such as the establishment of community fora or advisory boards, 
the creation of beat officers and foot patrols, a decentralization of the police and enhanced discre-
tion to officers on the beat, the establishment of small police stations similar to the koban police 
box within the communities as well as community watch programs, and often vaguely formulated 
plans for police-public partnerships.167 While these measures do in fact mirror the internationally 
supported best-practice guidelines of how to promote community policing in developing coun-
tries, the local historical and socio-political contexts of the respective countries were usually not 
taken into consideration, leaving behind hardly compatible local institutional bodies.168
This chapter will take a closer look at the actual implementation of the community policing 
approach in Singapore during the 1980s and in Timor-Leste since 2000. Singapore is neither a 
developing country nor a country in political transition. However, Singapore is one of the few 
non-Western cases where community policing has been adapted in a successful way. Moreover, 
the case of Singapore builds a direct causal link between the Japanese koban policing and the 
United Nation’s envisaged approach to policing in Timor-Leste.169
The Southeast Asian city-state with a non-democratic hegemonic party170 system experienced 
considerable economic development since its independence in the 1960s. This fast pace of eco-
nomic development and thorough societal change is of particular interest because economic 
and societal change also affects the political architecture and stability of a country.171 In fact, the 
Singaporean administration perceived the multi-ethnic composition of the newly built high-rise 
residential quarters as a potential threat to political stability.172 Hence, the implementation of com-
munity policing aimed first and foremost at state security and enhanced techniques to maintain 
public order. This government-driven and locally owned implementation of a community- 
oriented approach to policing during the 1980s, initially modelled after the Japanese koban, has 
been principally treated as a success story. Moreover, in the course of ten years, the Singaporean 
community-oriented policing version of the Japanese koban became an integral part of policing 
in the city-state.
Reviewing the case of Singapore will give important insights into necessary and sufficient 
conditions in order to promote and develop an environment conducive to community- 
oriented policing. Therefore, the first part of this chapter will take a closer look at Singapore’s 
actual community policing implementation process in the 1980s and 1990s, its promises, and 
its results.
This is followed by a case study on the development of community policing in Timor-Leste. 
Due to the comprehensive international support after the Indonesian retreat from Timor-Leste 
in 1999, the extensive political and legal powers of the United Nations Transitional Administra-
tion in Timor-Leste (UNTAET), Timor-Leste has been regarded as one of the most ideal places 
to successfully implement community policing due to the fact that the police had to be built from 
scratch, with the comprehensive political and technical powers of UNTAET. Yet, by reflecting 
the overall programmatic aims of the international donors, the actual implementation process, 
its stagnation, as well as recent strategic changes regarding how to foster the understanding of 
community policing within the Timorese police, it becomes clear that police reform towards 
community-oriented policing is not a straightforward process but heavily relies on adaptation 
processes, local ownership, and a functioning local police institution with basic police practice 
and knowledge in the first place.
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Implementing Community Policing in Singapore
The city-state of Singapore introduced the concept of community policing as one of the main pil-
lars of policing in the 1980s. Due to the overall economic development of the semi-authoritarian 
city-state, the rapidly changing housing situation of the Singaporeans and the establishment of 
large apartment blocks managed by the Singaporean Housing and Development Board (HDB), 
these densely populated and multi-ethnic housing complexes posed a challenge for the public 
order and societal peace. While the Singaporean police was fully operational in terms of law-
enforcement capabilities due to the British colonial rule and its concomitant focus on professional 
bureaucratic capacity building,173 its traditional reactive approach to policing, also inherited by 
the British colonial forces, was not able to cope with the rapid social and demographic changes in 
Singapore. Therefore, new strategies to contain the rising criminality in the apartment complexes 
and to effectively represent state authority by the police were sought after by the Singaporean 
administration.174
In search of new approaches to policing, Singaporean decision makers became aware of the 
growing trend to perceive the highly industrialized Japan as model for successful state develop-
ment. Scholarly monographs, such as the book Japan as Number One: Lessons for America by Ezra 
Vogel,175 underpinned the mainstream media in this assumption.176 Moreover, David H. Bayley’s177 
monograph on the successful Japanese police approach supported the narrative of Japan as a high-
technology country but with strong adherence to traditional Asian values and a virtually crimeless 
and peaceful society even more.
The Japanese koban policing seemed to be the most promising model to police Singapore, given 
the then relatively low crime rates and the high crime clearance rate in Japan; a fact which has been 
increasingly scrutinized since the 1990s and even called a myth.178 Moreover, as Ramcharan179 
points out, koban policing had a special appeal to Singaporean policy makers since koban policing 
promised to deliver more than just policing but had also a strong ability for social surveillance – a 
factor not to underestimate to maintain state security in a relatively newly founded city-state sur-
rounded by Malaysia and Indonesia, two perceived potential invaders.180
To introduce community policing in Singapore and to learn about the mechanisms and tech-
niques of this policing approach, the city-state’s administration organised and promoted sev-
eral study tours for police officers and bureaucrats to Japan. Moreover, the Japan International 
 Cooperation Agency (JICA) became active in Singapore during the early 1980s to facilitate koban 
policing for Singaporean police officials and to train Singaporean police officers in community 
policing techniques.181 As a result, the Singaporean police introduced their first “Neighbourhood 
Police Posts” (NPP) in 1983. These NPP, based on the idea of the Japanese koban boxes, were 
responsible for nearby housing complexes. It was the stated aim of the Singaporean police that the 
introduction of the NPP should foster trust between the residents and the police, to reduce crime, 
and that the NPP officer should set an example of civic duties and values in daily life for the HDB 
residents.182
NPP officers conducted their service along several lines of strategy: For one, NPP officers aimed 
at improved police-community relations and signalled approachability through constant visibil-
ity on the complex compounds as well as through foot patrol. Moreover, the police approached 
local neighbourhood associations and nearby civil-society organisations to establish coopera-
tion regarding the organisation of awareness campaigns and the formation of neighbourhood 
watches.183 The NPP officers also started comprehensive outreach programs particularly targeted 
at youths. Daily youth clubs were aimed at teaching juveniles how to avoid conflicts and advising 
them not to get involved into youth gang business. These workshops and youth clubs were organ-
ized and run by NPP officers as well as volunteers from the nearby HDB complexes.184 Further-
more, the Singaporean administration started comprehensive awareness campaigns on the role of 
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the reformed police and the necessity for each citizen to fight crime in cooperation with the police 
to ultimately achieve a safer Singapore.185
Based on the koban policing, NPP officers also conducted house visits to all the HDB residents. 
House visits functioned as starting point for police-citizen approximation in general, but also 
as possibility to gather information on the respective residents, their living circumstances, and 
additional information on the neighbourhood.186 While NPP were regular police, NPP regula-
tions did not allow executing arrests. As a reaction to the criticism by police officers and politi-
cians regarding the limited executive powers of the NPP officers, the NPP were replaced by the 
“Neighbourhood Police Centres” (NPC) in 1997. Unlike the previous NPP officers, the NPC offic-
ers had extended executive powers such as making arrests and conducting police investigations. 
Moreover, the establishment of the more centralized NPC were a reaction to the ongoing urban 
growth. By centralizing the community policing service and co-locating NPC officers in Commu-
nity Centres, the police gained better access to the respective communities in order to organize 
crime prevention and awareness campaigns and programmes.187
Overall, the introduction of the NPP scheme meant a departure from reactive policing. More-
over, the Singaporean approach to community policing was perceived as a success and a possibility 
for strengthening the police-citizen relations. As a result, Singaporeans participated in crime- 
prevention programmes organized by the NPP and later the NPC in collaboration with the Com-
munity Centres. Thang and Gan188 report an increase in police-citizen cooperation due to improved 
communication channels and trust in the police in general on behalf of the citizens.
Similar to the adaptation of European continental modes of policing in 19th century Imperial 
Japan and the local creation of koban policing, the implementation process of the Japanese koban 
in Singapore during the 1980s also features elements of adaptation and local reinterpretation to 
create a local version of community policing.
Due to rapid economic development and socio-political transformations, the administration 
of the densely populated multi-ethnic city-state sought new approaches to policing. To ensure 
political and social order, the Singaporean political leadership sought suitable solutions for how 
to reduce the overall crime in the city-state and to maintain public order. The most promising 
approach for this endeavour seemed to the Japanese koban. Driven by the political will and com-
mitment for change, the Singaporean political leadership promoted the implementation of koban 
in Singapore and its adaptation to the local context. Therefore, the established Neighbourhood 
Police Posts (NPP) in the large apartment blocks and concomitant police initiatives to prevent 
crime represent a very own version of koban in Singapore. It has to be noted that, in contrast to the 
relatively ethnic homogenous society in Japan, Singapore is a multi-ethnic society with parallel 
existing cultural and religious normative concepts. Therefore, a local reinterpretation of the exter-
nal koban approach was a necessity to be applicable to the Singaporean context. Yet, driven by a 
broad local ownership and the necessary bureaucratic police capacity, the Singaporean version of 
koban succeeded and even experienced an adjustment in 1997 with extended executive powers to 
the Neighbourhood Police Centres (NPCs).
Implementing Community Policing in Timor-Leste
In line with the general international trend of perceiving community-based policing as the most 
suitable tool to overcome police brutality in conflict-affected and transitional societies, the United 
Nations as well as several international donors aimed at the implementation of community 
policing in Timor-Leste after its independence from Indonesia and the military intervention of 
INTERFET troops in 1999.
The case of Timor-Leste is considered as a crucial case regarding the external implementation of 
police reforms in post-conflict scenarios because the country was entrusted to the United Nations 
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) during the transitional phase between 
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1999 and 2002. At that time, UNTAET had comprehensive legal, executive, and judicial pow-
ers at its disposal. In this position, UNTAET enacted several regulations on the establishment 
of the Timorese police and the Timorese armed forces, outlining their composition, tasks, and 
directions, respectively. Furthermore, UNTAET was one of the most comprehensive missions of 
the United Nations with one of the highest manning levels.189 However, due to its Portuguese 
colonial legacy as well as its twenty-five-year incorporation into the unitary state of Indonesia 
until 1999, Timor-Leste never experienced rule-based and accountable policing. Contrary to the 
British colonial state-building activities in mainland Southeast Asia, the Portuguese colonial rul-
ers did not seek to create viable bureaucratic apparatuses in their occupied overseas territories. 
Particularly then, Portuguese Timor was chronically underfunded and misgoverned. Militarized 
forces policed the settlements and the countryside at discretion.190 Hence, the concept of a police 
service working along the lines of binding legal regulations and human rights, let alone the con-
cept of policing as a public good, was non-existent.
As illustrated in the first section of this chapter, the implementation of community policing 
by the United Nations in Timor-Leste followed the assumption that Timor-Leste, as an Asian 
country, would easily and successfully adapt the guiding principles of community policing, as 
 Singapore did in the 1980s.191 However, contrary to the donor’s expectations, a community- 
oriented approach to policing in line with liberal democratic values did not materialize in Timor-
Leste, even after ten years of independence. Only recently have instances of community-oriented 
policing emerged in several rural districts of the country.
The increasing attractiveness of community policing within international policy circles since 
the mid-1990s, as well as the general assumption that community policing would improve police- 
citizen relations in post-conflict and transitional countries, influenced the United Nations to declare 
community policing as the intended policing approach in independent Timor-Leste. Mandated 
by the United Nations Security Council192 in 1999 with executive, legislative, and judicial powers, 
UNTAET soon started to establish a local police force in Timor-Leste.193 According to the United 
Nations General Secretary,194 and in line with the overall goal of implementing a community-
based approach to policing in Timor-Leste, the United Nations Police (UNPOL) was advised to 
execute community policing in Timor-Leste. However, apart from a lecture about community 
policing during the pre-deployment training for UNPOL officers, precise specifications and terms 
of reference for how to uniformly conduct community policing in Timor-Leste were not issued 
by the United Nations. Ambiguous specifications concerning the proposed policing approach in 
Timor-Leste, combined with the heterogeneous composition of UNPOL, with more than forty 
contributing countries, therefore led to an overall confusion as to how to ultimately police the 
post-conflict country.195
As a result, UNPOL officers conducted community policing according to their very own inter-
pretations about community policing. In one case, a group of UNPOL officers stayed with their 
PNTL counterparts in the police station and abstained from going on patrol or making con-
tact with the nearby residents since the officers’ understanding of community policing revolved 
around the idea that the community should solve problems on their own without the assistance 
of the police. In another case, UNPOL officers organized various small-scale sporting events in 
their policing districts to establish contacts between the Timorese police and youth groups living 
nearby.196
Apart from the United Nations’ police-building activities, several bilateral donors engaged 
in implementing community policing in Timor-Leste, particularly Japan, Australia, and 
New Zealand.197 Since 2001, Japan promoted community policing through JICA in Timor-Leste. 
As part of the training program, JICA regularly organized educational tours for Timorese police 
officers in Japan to learn about koban policing and to get an idea of the Japanese approach to 
police-citizen relationships.198
Despite the offered training programs for Timorese police officers, however, there were sceptical 
voices, even within JICA, on the actual feasibility of implementing community policing as the main 
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approach to policing in Timor-Leste; while some Timorese police officers eventually embraced the 
community policing approach as a possibility for fostering police-citizen relationships, the  majority 
of PNTL officers would still reject this “soft” approach to policing and vehemently question its 
utility and applicability to the Timorese context.199
As another bilateral donor, the New Zealand Police engaged in promoting community 
policing in Timor-Leste. Apart from supporting the then–United Nations mission200 in its attempt 
to implement a community-oriented policing approach in Timor-Leste since 2002 the New Zealand 
Police also conducted a pilot project on community policing support from 2008 to 2010 in selected 
districts. Moreover, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) promoted community policing as part of the 
Timor-Leste Police Development Programme (TLPDP) since 2004. The declared aim of both  projects 
was not to present community policing as a foreign policing model to the Timorese police and the 
population but rather to exemplify the benefits of community-oriented police work in practice 
and to communicate the underlying philosophy of community policing to the participating PNTL 
officers.201
Officially, community policing has been supported by the Timorese police command and the 
political leadership through public statements and police internal regulations. In this respect the 
Timorese administration fully complied with the requirements of the bilateral and multilateral 
donors to implement community policing in Timor-Leste. However, there has been an increas-
ing subtle resistance to international demands on police reform, and actual alterations within 
the Timorese police rather appeared as mere tactical concessions to maintain the internationally 
funded support to the Timorese police.202
One of the main steps to implement the community policing approach within the Timorese 
police was the formation of the Community Policing Department (Departementu Policiamento 
Comunitário) within the PNTL General Command based on the PNTL Organic Law of 2009.203 
The department is officially tasked with planning and programming of community policing 
activities within the PNTL, the active communication of community policing activities of the 
PNTL to the public as well as the support of rural police stations in implementing community 
policing.
Long-time national and international observers, however, questioned the actual willingness of 
the political leadership and the police command to thoroughly implement community policing as 
the main policing approach in Timor-Leste because community policing still has been perceived 
as a “soft”, ineffective, and alien approach to policing.204 Meaningful local ownership regarding the 
implementation of a community-oriented approach to policing was therefore missing within the 
Timorese political leadership.
Moreover, conflicts between the Timorese police and the Timorese armed forces (Falintil­ Forças 
de Defesa de Timor Leste (F­FDTL)) about areas of responsibility for internal security might also 
have had an impact on the decision of the police command not to follow a  thorough implemen-
tation of community policing. According to this reasoning, a comprehensive  implementation of 
community policing within the PNTL would curtail the police’s ability for robust policing and 
yield the floor for permanent deployments in the field internal security to the F-FDTL,205 an 
outcome which would counter the United Nations’ aspirations of  establishing a clear-cut role 
allocation for the Timorese armed forces with a definite focus on external  security, and for the 
police with the sole focus on internal security.206 Additionally, there has been broad resistance, 
particularly within lower echelons of the PNTL, to approaches to policing perceived as “soft” 
and “unmanly”. Moreover, as an UN official confirmed,207 there is an undisputed perception 
that effective policing is based on dominance, assertiveness, and the display of weapons to gain 
compliance on behalf of the citizens.
According to the commander of the community policing department, the community polic-
ing officers conduct house visits, hold meetings with traditional suco leaders, and visit schools to 
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promote community policing and good relations between the police and the population on a regular 
basis. Moreover, the department is responsible for teaching other PNTL units community policing 
techniques and ensuring that there is a general understanding of community policing within the 
PNTL.208 A local NGO, however, despite being supportive to the overall development of the com-
munity  policing approach in Timor-Leste, argued that there is no satisfying commitment on behalf 
of PNTL officers to promote police-citizen cooperation.209 Given the limited manning level of the 
community policing department of around nine police officers only,210 and measured against the total 
PNTL-manning level of approximately 3,400 officers in 2012, it is no surprise that community polic-
ing has had a limited impact at all.
Realizing the difficulties of implementing community policing as the main policing approach 
in Timor-Leste as well as the increasing resistance to the community policing approach by the 
local political leadership, the Australian TLPDP altered its strategy from conducting general 
 community policing classes to a focussed supporting programme for mid-level officers only.211 
Led by the insight that the context of Australian policing cannot be simply transferred to Timor-
Leste, the TLPDP rather aimed at a sustained training in three core areas: police management and 
leadership, investigations, and administration.212
The adjusted strategy of the TLPDP explicitly aimed at a sustained mindset change from within 
the mid-level police management. The Australian approach to police reform towards reflective, 
communication-based and problem-oriented policing in Timor-Leste therefore had to depart 
from the dogmatic understanding of simply implementing standardized best-practice toolkits to 
a different country context.213 Instead of promoting a relatively vague policing concept with rela-
tively little compatibility to the actual Timorese policing experience, the TLPDP’s strategy rather 
fell back to teaching the very foundations of basic police practice and knowledge.
The successor program of the New Zealand Police in Timor-Leste started in 2011 and was exe-
cuted in collaboration with the Asia Foundation. While the “Timor-Leste Community Policing 
Programme” (TLCPP) of the New Zealand Police focussed on community policing-related train-
ing of Timorese police officers, such as mentoring in communication strategies with the popula-
tion as well as public outreach, the Asia Foundation component (“Conflict Mitigation Through 
Community-Oriented Policing Programme”) organized awareness campaigns and communication 
training for traditional suco councils.214 The training manuals of the TLCPP programme and Asia 
Foundation for the Timorese police215 relied basically on standard measures of Problem-Oriented 
Policing such as the SARA tool. Furthermore, the training programs focussed rather on hands-on 
recommendations for basic police work and communication strategies than on a rigid  guidance 
of theoretical underpinnings of community policing. The declared aim of the programme was to 
 present community policing not as a foreign approach to policing with limited relevance to the 
Timorese context but as a highly effective and feasible approach to policing based on a sound 
partnership between the police and the population.216
As part of a second step in implementing community policing in Timor-Leste, New Zealand’s 
TLCCP and the Asia Foundation approached the district police commands and the respective 
communities. By establishing more than one hundred community police councils in the districts 
and by closely mentoring community policing officers, both the local police as well as the com-
munity members approached each other and increased police-citizen communication.217
Moreover, the commander of the Timorese Community Policing Department reformulated 
the overall community policing strategy for the Timorese police and created the so-called V.I.P 
approach (Visibility, Involvement, and Professionalism). As part of this new community policing 
approach, community policing officers in the sub-districts (Ofisial Polísia Suku, OPS) were explic-
itly charged with taking part in council meetings and increased communication with the com-
munity members.218 Officially, the PNTL command embraces the notion of serving the people of 
Timor-Leste and reiterates in the PNTL Strategic Plan 2014–2018 the objective of adopting the 
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V.I.P. approach not only in the Community Policing Department but in all units and departments 
of the PNTL.219
In fact, the Timorese approach to community-oriented policing is not only the outcome of the 
recent donor initiatives by the Australian and New Zealand police-development  programmes 
in cooperation with the Asia Foundation alone, but also rests on Timorese experiences  during 
the Indonesian occupation (1975–1999).220 When the Japanese Imperial Armed Forces invaded 
the then–Dutch East Indies (today’s Indonesia), they also transferred known tools and  models 
of surveillance and control. To secure the Indonesian peninsula, the Japanese occupying 
 administration made use of the Japanese system of neighbourhood watches (tonari gumi)221 and 
functional equivalents to the rural chuzaisho policing posts. According to Sebastian,222 the 
Japanese even combined the tonari­gumi neighbourhood watch system with traditional Javanese 
watch systems (gotong royong) to strengthen the effectiveness of their surveillance and control 
measures. Furthermore, as Sebastian explains, the Japanese techniques of surveillance and com-
munity control were adopted by the Indonesian authorities after the Indonesian independence 
in 1949, and applied in the course of the Indonesian state-building endeavours across the vast 
Indonesian archipelago.223
Due to the Indonesian dual-function doctrine (dwifungsi), which allowed the Indonesian 
 military extensive powers in security as well as socio-political affairs, and in combination with the 
“Total People’s Defence and Security System” (Sistem Pertahanan Meanmanan Rakyat Semesta­
Sistem Hankamrata), the military was able to establish parallel administrative structures to the 
civilian authorities in all provinces of the country.224 On the village level, the Indonesian  military 
established the Babinsa (Bintara Pembina Desa) parallel to the local police, the Bimpolda (Bimb­
ingan Polisi Desa). Particularly in then-occupied Timor-Leste the Indonesian authorities used 
the Babinsa and Bimpolda to gather intelligence through active monitoring and surveillance of 
the respective community, by taking part in traditional suco councils and to single out  potential 
 resistance fighters.225 In essence, the Japanese tonari­gumi and the Indonesian Babinsa/Bimpolda 
policing were first and foremost used as tools to control and surveil the population by an  autocratic 
government.226 Hence, due to this legacy of community-integrated policing in Timor-Leste, a high 
ranking PNTL officer who also worked as Bimpolda during Indonesian rule equated the technical 
approach of community policing in post-independent Timor-Leste most notably with gathering 
information about the population.227 Moreover, a PNTL officer who works as OPS even stated 
that he does not see a difference between the Bimpolda and Babinsa policing and the current OPS 
approach in Timor-Leste at all.228
So far, the present OPS policing approach in Timor-Leste’s districts received positive appraisal 
from community members and police officers alike. While community members perceived the 
OPS as qualified mediators in cases of communal conflicts as well as in conflicts between sub-
districts and state authorities, a recent study by the Asia Foundation also highlighted an increased 
number of civilians approaching the police instead of customary elites in cases of hardship. Timor-
ese now increasingly address the OPS knowing that their concern is taken care of.229 Likewise, 
several interviewed police officers in the sub-districts stated a perceived trust of the respective 
community members in the sub-district police since the installation of OPS in their districts.230
However, despite the positive development regarding the implementation of OPS in the districts 
and increased trust of the district communities into the police, the OPS are understaffed and 
ill-equipped. Due to the poor manning level of OPS in the sub-districts, available OPS regularly 
have to cover more than one community and travel, also due to the bad infrastructure, several 
hours to reach their destination.231 Moreover, while OPS improved police-citizen relationships 
in several districts, successful OPS policing in the capital, Dili, has not materialized yet. Several 
local NGOs in Dili indicated that neither the regular PNTL nor OPS ever contacted them or 
anyone in the neighbourhood regarding the introduction of the novel V.I.P. community policing 
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approach.232 While the director of a local NGO233 assumes that the absence of OPS in the sukos of 
Dili is caused by the fragmented social ethnic composition in the capital and concomitant difficul-
ties in approaching the respective communities by OPS, international police advisers stationed in 
Timor-Leste rather see the general unwillingness of police officers in Dili as the main reason for 
the lack of successful police-citizen cooperation, an assessment several police officers in Dili also 
confirmed.234
Despite comprehensive international support, the implementation of community policing in 
Timor-Leste has been – and still is – a dragging process. The United Nations’ assumption of being 
able to implement a community-oriented approach to policing in Timor-Leste similar to the 
 Singaporean model failed due to several reasons.
First, the United Nations and several bilateral donors did not take into account the established 
modes and approaches in Timor-Leste during the Portuguese colonial era as well as during the 
Indonesian occupation. Both occupiers relied mainly on reactive, repressive, and militarized 
approaches to policing.235 Since then, the Timorese population rather feared the police and did 
not trust the security forces; the general perception of the police on behalf of the Timorese, even 
after the independence of Timor-Leste in 2002, was rather negative.
Secondly, the United Nations and bilateral donors had to establish a Timorese police  institution 
after the Indonesian retreat in 1999. The actual police building by the United Nations Police 
(UNPOL) faced harsh criticism due to inexperienced trainers and politicized recruiting proce-
dures.236 Hence, the national Timorese police resorted to established practices of reactive and mili-
tarized policing once the main training initiatives by the UNPOL ended. Moreover, the Timorese 
police still lack elementary police practice and knowledge skills.237 These above-mentioned factors 
impede a service-oriented police service towards the Timorese population, let alone a community-
oriented approach to policing.
However, while the introduction of OPS as community-oriented approach to policing in rural 
areas is a promising sign for police reform in Timor-Leste, there are still reported instances of 
police brutality and impunity within the Timorese security sector.238 Hence, a thorough imple-
mentation of community policing in Timor-Leste requires not only a thorough mindset change 
within the Timorese police and the willingness to actually serve the people, but also a consolida-
tion of basic police practice and knowledge and the availability of necessary equipment in all 
districts.
Contrary to the discussed cases of Japan and Singapore, the implementation of a community- 
oriented approach to policing in Timor-Leste faced several difficulties.
Timor-Leste holds a legacy of police brutality and human rights violations during the Portu-
guese and Indonesian occupations of the half-island. Moreover, the withdrawal of the Indone-
sian occupying forces in 1999 left the country with no institutionalised police in place. However, 
Timor-Leste also experienced instances of community policing during the Indonesian occu-
pation phase, from 1975 to 1999. The Indonesian authorities implemented a concept of com-
munity control and surveillance on the village level in Timor-Leste, a concept the Indonesians 
themselves learned, adapted, and reinterpreted from the Japanese Imperial Army and their 
occupation of the Indonesian archipelago during World War II. On the conceptual basis of the 
Japanese koban and the tonari­gumi neighbourhood watch system, the Indonesian authorities 
created the Babinsa and Bimpolda to gather intelligence in the Timorese communities and to 
identify potential pockets of resistance and clandestine networks. However, this approach to 
community policing in the Timorese villages first and foremost aimed at state security of the 
occupying administration and was not to the benefit of the people. Therefore, this community 
policing approach was perceived by the local population as a factor of insecurity rather than 
security. Moreover, due to this negative experience of community policing in Timor-Leste in 
an authoritarian context, it is challenging for local and external police reformers to rewrite the 
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community policing narrative towards a liberal-democratic concept of policing that adheres to 
inherent SSR principles and good governance.
While the local police build-up from scratch by the United Nations and several international 
donors between 2000 and 2002 provided a unique window of opportunity to create the foundations 
for an accountable, human rights abiding, community-oriented police service in Timor-Leste, 
practices of brutality and abuse of power by the police against Timorese civilians remained.239
Comprehensive financial- and technical support by the United Nations and several  international 
donors to promote and to implement community-oriented policing did not lead to a sustained 
police reform in Timor-Leste. Rather, subtle or even passive resistance on behalf of the Timorese 
police and political leadership towards the externally “imposed” concept of policing prevailed, 
nurtured by the perception that this concept of policing is “inapplicable” to the local context. 
While the necessary local ownership regarding the implementation of rule-based and human rights 
oriented policing was missing, the Timorese political leadership instead showed commitment and 
ownership in establishing and boosting robust and specialized police units. Moreover, missing 
overall bureaucratic police professionalism and capacity accompanied by grave instances of impu-
nity for police abuse of power due to missing internal oversight functions gave way to shattered 
police-community relations in Timor-Leste.
This time, a necessary adaptation process to foster a community-oriented approach – or at least 
basic patterns of basic police practice and knowledge – in Timor-Leste were launched by for-
eign donors. Realizing the continuing resistance towards a Western-driven community-oriented 
approach to policing on behalf of local decision makers, the Australian TLDPD, the New Zealand 
TLCPP, and the Asia Foundation opted for a revision and adjustment to the local realities. Under-
standing that a sophisticated approach to policing, such as community policing, needs to rest on a 
solid foundation of basic police practice and knowledge, the adjusted reform approach focussed on 
basic but sustained mentoring of police professionalism, capacity, and accountability. Apparently, 
basic policing was the single common denominator between the Timorese legacy of policing and 
external police reform concepts, such as community policing. Therefore, building on this com-
mon ground enabled foreign donors to reach their Timorese counterparts and to incrementally 
promote a rule-based, accountable, and human rights oriented approach to policing. Eventually, 
as the establishment of the OPS, the Timorese version of a community policing officer, suggests, 
instances of a local ownership within the Timorese police towards the promotion of community 
policing in Timor-Leste emerged.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The paper traced the historical origins of community policing, analysed transfer,  implementation, 
and adaptation processes of approaches to community policing in Imperial Japan, Singapore, 
and Timor-Leste, and identified supporting as well as obstructive variables to the establishment 
of community policing. Each of the cases studies provided insights on necessary preconditions 
for the facilitation of reform towards the implementation of community policing but also high-
lighted country-specific dynamics and developments of how to adapt to or interpret imported 
governance concepts. This chapter compares, synthesizes, and discusses the case studies’ main 
findings and provides answers to the initial research questions on the actual historical origins of 
present-day community policing, the necessary conditions to establish community policing, and 
the  possibility for promoting community policing along the lines of good governance and SSR in 
developing and transitional countries.
Fostering Community Policing by Building Basic Police Capacities and 
Supporting Incremental Organizational Change
As the empirical case studies suggest, community-oriented policing is not per se a tool for policing 
in line with the normative goals of SSR and good governance. Rather, techniques of community-
oriented policing have also been used to establish thorough one-sided information networks and 
surveillance mechanisms to gather in-depth information about the respective communities. This 
has been particularly true in scenarios of rapid socio-political and economic change in autocratic 
political systems (19th century Imperial Japan, Singapore) and cases of repressive foreign occupa-
tion (Imperial Japan in occupied Indonesia and Indonesia in occupied Timor-Leste). The main 
security concerns in these scenarios revolved primarily around state security rather than people’s 
security.
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In light of the empirical findings, an immediate continuity from the often-cited origins of 
 community policing to an aspired contemporary community-oriented approach to policing that 
corresponds to a liberal democratic system cannot be attested without restrictions. An uncritical 
and ahistorical appraisal of community-oriented approaches to policing as a best-practice model 
to overcome shattered police-community relations in post-conflict and transitional countries 
would therefore miss the point.
But as the empirical case studies also suggest, community policing works in places where 
there is a functioning and professional executive body acting according to rigid regulations. The 
 discussed case of Singapore is paradigmatic in this respect. The government-driven and directed 
 implementation of the Japanese approach to community policing is a clear indication of local 
owner ship. Secondly, the Singaporean police was able to adopt the approach to community- 
oriented policing due to its existing bureaucratic professionalism acquired through its British 
legacy of administrative and organisational capacity building.240
Hence, a sustained implementation of community-oriented policing which finds support not 
only on behalf of the local administration and the executive security agencies but also on behalf of 
the local communities, needs to be built on already existing police institutions with experience in 
bureaucratic professionalism. Particularly the establishment of internal control and accountability 
mechanisms is key to ensure rule-based and human rights oriented courses of action on behalf of 
police officers. Alternatively, executing sudden and all-encompassing police reform with the aim 
of establishing community policing as a guiding principle in a scenario where basic police  practice 
and knowledge, accountability, and rule of law are more or less non-existent due to legacies of 
police brutality, is unsustainable and unrewarding. In these scenarios, meaningful and tailored 
capacity building initiatives complemented by comprehensive institutional-reform measures will 
introduce incremental but sustained change in policing.
Again, it has to be stressed that governance concepts cannot be transferred one-to-one to  different 
cultural environments, but need to be adjusted to the specific country context. The  adaptation 
process should ideally be driven and championed by local authorities to ensure a genuine local 
commitment and ownership. External actors can support – but cannot impose – the  introduction 
of a particular element or concept. Different ideas and perceptions of the implementation pro-
cess or the actual outcome may always exist. But external donors have to accept the fact that a 
local reinterpretation of the external concept and its adjustment to the local way of thinking is a 
necessary process of intercultural transfers, as the discussed case studies and existing research 
indicate. Draude highlights this dilemma when she argues that the increase of local ownership 
leads to the fact that external donors have to change their expectations.241 To what extent  external 
donors are willing to accept deviations from the actual concept is, of course, subject to their 
respective policies and agendas.
The ambivalent and uncritical equation of community policing with the concept of democratic 
policing not only dilutes different concepts of policing but also aggravates the actual implemen-
tation of police reform initiatives in a given country due to visionary expectations on the feasi-
bility of the reform process as well as on its ultimate outcome. Therefore, it is indispensable to 
provide the fundament of basic and professional bureaucratic policing skills in a given country, 
first through specially programmed capacity building measures. Building on this “core policing”, 
as Bayley and Perito242 put it, will enable the local police to establish basic policing services to the 
communities and to incrementally expand their repertoire to more complex approaches of how to 
interact with the population and how to deal with violence and crime. However, it is particularly 
important for a post-conflict scenario to promote and to initiate a mindset change of the police 
leadership and its mid-level management to enable sustained commitment for reform and police 
work in line with SSR inherent norms, provisions, and values. Since SSR is explicitly connected 
to Western liberal norms and values, a local mindset change towards the acceptance of these very 
normative values is inevitable.
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As long as there is no basic police practice and knowledge in place, international police reform 
initiatives in cooperation with the local police force will have a hard time identifying a necessary 
point of leverage to actually initiate the intended reform measures. Insisting on the unconditional 
implementation of highly normative provisions of good governance and SSR by external donors 
before establishing a professionally working police body will not bring the anticipated change 
but might trigger local resistance or indifference instead. But building basic capacities and sup-
porting incremental organizational change in collaboration with the necessary ownership of local 
authorities within a normative framework of good governance will eventually lay foundations for 
a starting point to promote the implementation of more complex reforms.
This long-term prospect of police reform efforts admittedly collides with the rather narrow 
funding cycles of international and national donor missions and programmes. But rethinking 
donor programmes in terms of long-term commitment would definitely help to make a difference.
Necessary Conditions to Establish Community Policing
The case studies’ main findings suggest that a pluralistic and democratic political system is not 
necessarily needed to establish community policing. In general, the necessary conditions to 
establish community policing are rather a police organization with, at least, basic professional 
bureaucratic capacities, a genuine commitment and political will on behalf of local authorities 
to promote and push for its implementation, and a concept or approach to community policing 
that actually matters to the respective local context and its realities. Ideally, this approach to com-
munity policing is devised or reinterpreted by local authorities and combines already-established 
approaches to policing with external approaches to policing. Policing cannot be separated from 
its political context, as stated in the introduction. Therefore, in order to promote and to establish 
a community-oriented approach to policing that is in line with the principles of SSR and good 
governance, a transformative context of democratization is necessary.
Finally, there are definitely prospects for establishing and promoting community policing along 
the lines of good governance and SSR in developing and transitional countries. However, such 
endeavours need time, commitment, and resources. It is an enduring and incremental process of 
harmonizing local professional police organizational capacities with the ideational superstructure 
of SSR and norms and values inherent in good governance. Simultaneously, there is the challeng-
ing but necessary task of creating a local version of community policing that speaks to the local 
realities and also carries the relevant local ownership.
Recommendations
•	Necessity of existing basic police capacity and knowledge
 Fostering community policing in developing or transitional countries without the ability 
to build on a certain level of local bureaucratic and operational police professionalism will 
not lead to a successful nor a sustained implementation of community policing  strategies. 
The implementation of community policing alone does not help to overcome existing 
deficiencies within the operational police service and a lack of professional knowledge of 
policing.
 Community policing is an approach to policing that rests on fundamental basics and  
the thorough knowledge of policing tools and ethics. Ideally, community policing adds to 
the already-existing understanding of communication strategies with the communities, of 
bureaucratic processes, of standard operational procedures, and of laws applicable to the 
local context. Finally, police professionalism also means accountability on all levels.
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 Therefore, the implementation of community policing needs to be built on a certain level of 
police professionalism and bureaucratic capacity. Interlinking capacity building  measures 
with an appropriate normative framework will provide a basis for more  sophisticated 
reform programmes. Unless a certain level of police professionalism is established first, 
reform initiatives aiming solely at the implementation of community policing will be 
 unrewarding.
•	Necessity of local ownership in adjusting external reform programmes
 Local ownership of police reform is key to ensuring comprehensive and sustained imple-
mentation of community policing. Resistance to police reform in general or community 
policing in particular by the police command as well as the political leadership of a given 
country may lead to a superficial implementation of community policing elements or even 
to resistance on behalf of the police officers. These forms of resistance may occur during 
the presence or after the departure of foreign police trainers and mean the actual failure of 
the police reform programme.
 In some cases, community policing units might still operate to fulfil foreign donors’ expec-
tations. However, lining up a rather symbolic unit of community policing is not for the 
good of the people but rather to maintain the impression of willingness to reform in order 
to receive continued financial and technical support by foreign donors.
 Hence, to avoid these kinds of scenarios, local police leadership and political leaders need 
to be involved into community policing programming from the start and to contribute 
to the overall project as much as possible. This close collaboration between foreign and 
local actors also helps to tailor a country-specific approach to community policing. As the 
paper’s findings suggest, a local reinterpretation of foreign programmes is also necessary to 
ensure a seamless implementation of a very local approach to policing communities, which 
is, ideally, in line with principles of SSR and good governance.
 However, foreign trainers and programmers should be open to regular alterations and 
adjustments of their strategies and programmes to meet country-specific developments 
and obstacles to police reform. Rigid foreign concepts and blueprints on how to promote 
community policing often proved to be meaningless for a successful and sustained imple-
mentation of community policing. This will eventually help to avoid the implementation 
of one-fits-all community policing strategies, which will become irrelevant not only to the 
local police but also to the local communities.
•	Integration of local communities and CSO in the reform process
 As police reform requires strong local ownership, local reformers as well as inter national 
donors should ensure the inclusion of local communities and civil-society organizations 
in the reform process. Since police reform in line with SSR principles aims at the estab-
lishment of a people-centred, human-security approach to policing, the very recipients 
of the police service know best what they expect from the police and in which areas 
they would like to see a change. Ideally, these initiatives should go beyond the com-
mon model of police-community fora and provide communities with the possibility for 
active discussion and shaping the future police service in their country by outlining ideas 
and concepts. Moreover, integrating community members into committees on strategic 
development planning of the police will not only facilitate trust in the police organiza-
tion, but also add to the general feeling that the police are not isolated from but a part of 
the society. Even after several stages of police reform, community feedback on the police 
performance is essential to evaluate and to assess reform benchmarks and should there-
fore maintained.
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•	Familiarization of foreign community policing trainers and programmers with the 
country context
 As several empirical findings on police reform suggest,243 resorting to ready-made tem-
plates for the implementation of community policing in a given country will not bring the 
anticipated success.
 In every country, police-community relationships rest on a local history, evolved tradi-
tions, and specific normative perceptions on how to provide security. Moreover, under-
standing the local context also helps to realize different political agendas and diverging 
political interests among the local partners. Therefore, external programmes and trainers 
need to be sensitized with the local context and align their community policing strate-
gies accordingly. Moreover, foreign trainers and programmers should learn to accept local 
realities and manage their expectations regarding a smooth reform process.
 Getting to know the country they are working in not only helps to devise a country-specific 
community policing programme that speaks to the local realities, but also helps to become 
accepted by local decision makers and practitioners in the long run.
To conclude, community policing is by far not the only solution to overcome shattered police-
community relations. As already mentioned at another point, the performance of the police in 
a given country reflects the overall political orientation and agenda of the government. For a 
compelling reason, contemporary SSR follows a comprehensive and all-encompassing agenda: 
It not only focuses on single institutions or actors but aims at the reform of the whole political 
system and, ideally, at affiliated agencies and organizations as well. Therefore, focussing solely on 
the implementation of a vaguely formulated community policing approach and ticking boxes on 
default best-practice indicators in a country where police brutality and impunity prevail will not 
foster sustained change.
Community policing can and should be one element of international development cooperation 
as part of SSR as far as the local preconditions of a professionally developed policing body and 
the necessary local political commitment to reform are given. Promoting community-oriented 
approaches to policing in these favourable contexts, however, also means departing from Western 
best-practice standards and assisting local actors in the formulation of applicable and relevant 
local approaches to pluralist and rule of law-based policing.
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